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Natural Law Lecture 2003
LAW AND WHAT I TRULY SHOULD DECIDE
JOHN FNNIS

I
Suppose we tried to think about law without trying first to describe it or to
work out what the concept of it is. Suppose we asked instead whether, and if
so why, and when, we-or more precisely each one of us-should favor
introducing, having, endorsing, maintaining, complying with and enforcing it.
We would be trying to think about law, about something not limited to our
own time and town, but as something that people of any time and place of
which we are aware would, as we can understand, have the same or similar
need for and reasons to comply with as we have. But this subject matter we
would be calling law from the outset because we would be beginning these
reflections with an awareness, linguistic, experiential, and by report, of the
law of our own time and town or country. Of that we could give some
description, because we have some understanding of the sorts of things
referred to in our neighborhood as parts of or related to the law (of our time
and town, our law), and thus a conception or concept of that law, a conception
which we could, if asked (or if reflecting), sketch out as a set of beliefs about
an aspect of what's going on around us, beliefs which we're quite prepared to
amend in the light of new information or of our own reflections about the
consistency of these beliefs with each other and with other things we believe.
Structurally our inquiry would be running parallel to the course of inquiry
recommended by Aristotle. Take a very different context, a subject-matter of
the kind that exist and are what they are whether we consider them or not. For
example, eclipses of the moon. People talk about eclipses of the moon, and
so one can ask what an eclipse is, not because one's trying either to record or
even to get clear about their speech, or their ideas (concepts), but because
one's interested in the sort of thing or things they are referring to. They talk
about eclipses, referring to a black patch moving over the face of the moon,
not nightly or monthly but regularly though quite rarely. Aristotle's counsel'
is: translate the What? into a Why? Why does a black patch move across the
1. PosteriorAnalytics 11.290a5-20: "...in all our searches we seek either whether there is
an explanation or what the explanation is....For in all these cases it is evident that what
something is and why it is are the same. What is an eclipse? Privation of light from the moon
by the earth's screening. Why is there an eclipse? or Why is the moon eclipsed? Because the
light leaves it when the earth screens it."
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bright face of the moon? I'll skip now to the end of the inquiry. The black
patch is the shadow of the earth, that is, it appears because the Earth is
blocking the light from the sun, and so an eclipse of the moon is the visible
result of the Earth coming between the Sun and the Moon, which can happen
not nightly or monthly but only-because of the differing but correlated cycles
of the Earth and the Moon around the Sun-more rarely but regularly. That's
what a lunar eclipse is. Or take a subject-matter of the kind that are what they
are because we have decided to exercise control over natural matter. What is
a clock? Perhaps the only ones I'm aware of are worked by chains and
pulleys. But why have these chains and pulleys, and a face and hands (or a
dial and numbers, or whatever) connected up to each other like this? As an
instrumentfor measuring the passing of time relative to some unit or units
marked by some perceptible marker such as a hand on or passing, or a frame
around, a visible numeral. Or take a subject-matter of the kind that involve
our putting our own thoughts in order. What is an argument? I hear the word
used in relation to statements, or connected series of statements, asserting
reasons for accepting some proposition; I learn soon enough that some such
statements or sets of statements do really give reason for their purported
conclusion, while others, intended and perhaps appearing to do so, fail, on
reflection, to do so. Why link these statements in a series, or juxtapose the
one statement (premise) with the other (conclusion)? In order to compel or
justify or warrant accepting the latter. So I come to understand that not
everything proposed and spoken of and considerable as a reason is a reason,
and that not every argument is really any argument at all for what it is
proposed as arguing for. That is, part of coming to understand what argument
really is consists in coming to understand that, and why, not all arguments are
really arguments at all, even though these non-arguments-failed, fallacious,
invalid arguments-are still, in a secondary or watered down sense,
arguments, as eclipses and clocks and people and most of the other subjectmatters in this or any imaginable universe are simply not.
So the enquiry we are hypothesising, the enquiry about law, starts humbly
enough as: Why have the sort of thing or things that get called the law and
legal system, legal institutions, and processes and arrangements that we call
the law of our time and town? "Why have it?" is of course elliptical for
"Why, if at all, should we have it?" The enquiry is nakedly about whether and
if so why I, the reflecting person doing the inquiring, should want there to be
this sort of thing, and be willing to do what I can and should to support and
comply with it (if I should). It arises in the course of reflection, deliberative
reflection, on what I should really do, here and now, and with my life as far
as I can envisage it.
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This sort of radically practical question first arises, Aquinas suggests, 2
when I am young enough to be in the junior grade school playground, aged
about seven-about as far back as my adult memory of deliberation goes.
Someone is teasing or punching or pinching someone else to make them cry.
Should Ijoin in? Or try to help the victim? Or call the teacher? Or just hope
that the teacher will come and restore order? Or hope that no one will
intervene to spoil this fun? Or be completely indifferent to all this and just get
on with my sandwiches? If the teacher does come and break things up, should
I be glad if she gives both the bully and the victim impartially a slap or
detention or expulsion? Or should I hope she'll try to establish what
happened, and deal differently with the two, restraining the willfulness of the
one, requiring also some restitution and apology, while comforting and
reasserting the dignity of the other? In such primal incidents, at the dawn of
the age of deliberative reason, Aquinas suggests we find the child-you or
me-confronted with the need to choose whether to be the sort of person who
joins the bully, or instead the sort of person who does what they can to help
the victim and the teacher if and when that teacher appears and acts to police
the scene, judge the guilty, and make clear to all what will and will not be
treated as acceptable conduct in the playground, the classroom, the bus stop
outside the school, or anywhere else where one school child can interact with
another. The child brings to this primal moment of choice many years of
emotional formation, but now for the first time can envisage the choice as one
between options which truly are instancesof benefits which can be found in
countless other instances, so that the immediate issue or practical problem of
what to do in this situation invites deliberation which, however rapidly it takes
place, is open to thoughts of the kind: What if I were the victim in a similar
situation of disparate strength and aggressiveness? What if many people were
free to do this to others? And so forth.
In such childhood situations one enters what I shall call the moral domain
or, fully synonymously, the ethical domain or domain of morality. In that
domain, which we never leave save through unconsciousness or a supervening
incapacity to understand options as instances of intelligible benefits realizable
in indefinitely many situations, the question is always: What should I decide?
"Decide" straddles two distinguishable aspects of the existential issue: Which
of the alternative incompatible courses of conduct (action or inaction) of mine
should I think a reasonable option for me here and now? And do I here and
now choose and at the relevant time carry out one of those reasonable options,
or the one and only reasonable one among the options available, or do I
2. See the texts cited and summarized in Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal
Theory (Oxford, 1998), 41 n. 68.
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choose and carry out one of the options which I judge attractive even though
unreasonable (because cruel, disruptive, or in some other way unfair, and/or
because a waste of my opportunities for pursuing and doing good)? Decision,
then, includes both the practical judgment (a judgment of the kind we call
judgments of conscience) and the self-directing, self-determining, self-shaping
choice. Inasmuch as it is obvious to me that I can be mistaken in my
judgments about what is and is not reasonable, the issue presents itself more
precisely as about what I truly should decide. The primary meaning of
"morality"-that is, morality's primary reality-is as the set of considerations
that I understand as bearing upon the making of such decisions, and as
available criteria for assessing my decisions as good or bad precisely as
decisions, that is, as right-because choosing and putting into practice
judgments which are true--or wrong because not doing so.
In, and in relation to, such childhood situations as the one I recalled from
my playground, we did then and we do now as adults understand the need for
a pattern of relationships between ourselves and other persons such that force
is not used to inflict pain or other harm but only to preserve or restore a proper
pattern of relationships. Among the aspects of this pattern are (i) that what
one person reasonably possesses cannot be taken from that person without a
showing that another person has a better reason-to be sharply distinguished
from a stronger desire or stronger capability to impose desire-to have that
possession; and (ii) that some persons have special responsibility for deciding
on behalf of, or in relation to, all persons involved what pattern of relationships will be treated as acceptable, what to do about violations of it, whether
or not to change it in light of new circumstances or of new or newly represented arguments, and so forth.
Part of a school's teaching, then, will concern the school's own rules about
times of classes, conduct within classes, acceptance of the authority of
teachers and perhaps of designated pupils and a head teacher, misconduct in
the playground, dress and demeanor on and off the premises of the school on
schooldays, and so forth. Another part, small in bulk perhaps but weighty,
will be concerned to inform the children that shoplifting, playing truant,
vandalism, and suchlike are offences against the law of the land and therefore
also against the school's requirements of its pupils (even though not part of
the school's rules as such), and that they will be enforced not, in the first
instance, by the school's teachers but by the police and courts and custodial
authorities of the state. To a child who understands the case for not joining
the bully in the playground or the cheat in the schoolroom, the need for this
Law is obvious, too. And the case for not joining the bully was never merely
that I might get hurt by the bully or outranked by the cheat, but primarily that
it is unfair for anyone to be. The injustice of the bully and the cheat is what
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cries out for prevention and restitution and penalty-and for rules written or
otherwise posited (put in place) to make this clear in advance to all. The child
who thinks that (to put it as H.L.A. Hart did),3 we need rules (of school, town,
and country) promulgated to restrict the free use of violence, theft and fraud
means that we need themfor the sake above all ofjustice. The primary need
or necessity here is precisely a moral one. And any sensible adult clearheadedly thinking practically-i.e. in the context of the question what I truly
ought to do-likewise means just that. (Influenced by considerations 4 which
most of us here know operate, or have operated, in our own thinking, Hart did
not, alas, mean that.) Thus law is rightly conceived of as by its nature morally
valuable-not in the sense that Joseph Raz attributes to that phrase,5
according to which the thesis would be making a claim about "the way [law
or the law] is actually implemented in history", the obviously false claim that
law "in its historical manifestations through the ages [ ] has always, or
generally, been a morally valuable institution. 6 Rather, the sense of the thesis
is like the sense in which, as Raz accepts, promising is a morally valuable
institution. Or the sense in which the doctor says "You need medicine",
meaning something which by its nature is curative, without for a moment
claiming or imagining that what has been served up as medicine "through the
ages" has always, or generally, or even usually been curative.

3. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, [1961] 2nd ed., 1994), 91, 193-200.
4. These are hinted at in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford, 1981), 266-7: "Of
course, if it were the case, as a cognitive account of duty would hold it to be, that the statement
that the subject has a legal duty to act in a way contrary to his interests and inclinations entails
the statement that there exist reasons which are 'external' or objective, in the sense that they
exist independently of his subjective motivation, it would be difficult to deny that legal duty is
a form of moral duty. At least this would be so if it is assumed that ordinary non-legal moral
judgments of duty are also statements of such objective reasons for action. For in that case, to
hold that legal and moral duties were conceptually independent would involve the extravagant
hypothesis that there were two independent 'worlds' or sets of objective reasons, one legal and
the other moral." For all its caution, it is reasonable to infer from this that a meta-ethical
scepticism played a significant albeit largely unadmitted role in Hart's legal philosophy, and in
his conclusion on p. 267 that "judicial statements of the subject's legal duties need have nothing
directly to do with the subject's reasons for action", a conclusion of which he says "I am vividly
aware that to many it will seem paradoxical, or even a sign of confusion", coming as it does "at
the end of a chapter, a central theme of which is the great importance for the understanding of
law of the idea of authoritative reasons for action..." See also Hart, The Concept of Law, 191
and comments on this in my NaturalLaw and NaturalRights (Oxford, 1980), 30-31.
5. Or rather to the phrase which he treats as equivalent: "the law is a morally valuable
institution",
6. Joseph Raz, "About Morality and the Nature of Law," American Journal of
Jurisprudence48 (2003) 1, 13.
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No need to labor this line of thought much further. It is obvious-as
obvious, at least virtually and in rough outlines, to a child as it fully is to any
reflective and reasonable adult-that, for the sake of justice and a flourishing
community of people in good shape and doing as well as extrinsic circumstances permit, we need the set of rules, arrangements, processes, institutions,
and persons with responsibility and thus authority, the set that is commonly
called law, legal, legal system, and so forth. For the sake of justice, we need
the rules to be public, clear, general, stable, capable of being complied with,
and explicable to any fair-minded person; and we need them, again for
justice's sake, to be complied with (save where there is an overriding moral
obligation not to) by those whose responsibility it is to announce and/or
enforce them and/or to resolve disputes about their application. Some finer
points about what it is for a society to have its need for law adequately met are
elaborated by Timothy Endicott.7 His discussion proceeds by repudiating any
concept of the rule of law that "we should not aim for". That is a sound way
of proceeding in legal philosophy, though I am inclined to carp that just as it
would be odd to use the phrase "moral ideal" to describe the thought that one
shouldn't side with the bully or the cheat and that the teacher should urgently
sort things out, so there is something equivocal about the common saying that
the rule of law is an "ideal".8 The principles of the rule of law are, at least in
their main lines, moral requirements, strong even though not unconditional,
unqualifiable or indefeasible.
The life of the law, more precisely its primary reality, is not in the logic of
conceptual coherence or of understanding what other people have thought or
said or stipulated or commanded or enacted, nor in the experience of cause
and effect and patterns of recurrence. Those are part of its matrix of necessary
preconditions. The primary reality of the law is rather in its claim, as itself a
moral requirement, on my deliberating about what to decide-that is, what to
judge about the options available to me, and what to choose and do once I
have made my judgement. This mode of ourpositive law's existence-as a
morally legitimate and compelling, albeit conditionally and only defeasibly
compelling, claim on my action when I am thinking what to do as a plain
citizen (child or adult), a judge, a police officer, a tax inspector, or executor,
7. Timothy Endicott, "The Reason of the Law", American Journal of Jurisprudence48
(2003) 83, 85.
8. There is a sense in which the idea of having a society regulated by justice and
responsible government and the rule of law is an ideal (or three inter-related ideals). But there
is another sense in which the rule of law, like responsible government, and justice (all of which
are described by Endicott as ideals), is a set of moral requirementswhich in many situations are
here and now mandatory, rather than an ideal. (Endicott recognizes this, too, e.g. when he calls
responsible government a requirement.)
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and so forth-is the primary reality of law. It is primary because the rational
force of this claim is fully intelligible even before one knows anything much
about the content of the law and certainly before one has been taught anything
about law in general or "the concept of law".
That rational force, like all rational force, is at bottom the attractiveness of
truth. Because I judge it to be true that (say) the victim's bodily and
emotional well-being is as much an instantiation of intelligible human good
as the well-being of the bully or of myself, and true that this or any bully's
infliction of pain for the pleasure of it is a violation of the master moral
principle/requirement that one's choices should always be open to the
fulfillment of every human person, and a violation of that master principle's
specification in the Golden Rule of fairness, and true that offenders against
justice should not be left to enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing, I should, at
the moment of decision, treat as authoritative the positive legal norms
empowering somebody to appoint somebody else to the responsibility and
authority of adjudicating complaints of bullying and punishing them to an
extent specified not only by norms of fairness but also by positive rules
adopted "optionally" for the sake of consistency across wider spans of time
and social context. Indeed, if child, I should take the risk of reporting the
bully to the teacher, and if teacher, I should exercise the adjudicative and
punitive role according to the rules of the school, the law of the land, and the
requirements of fairness when the school rules and the law leave something
to be decided. And so forth, in reference to any more or less reasonable
legally posited rule or principle you like to consider: at the moment of
decision on an issue on which that rule bears, any obligation it expressly or
impliedly purports to impose, or to authorize the imposition of, is fit to be
acknowledged by me as truly what it purports to be, viz. the decisive regulator
of my action here and now-so decisive that it could be overridden only by
some competing moral obligation bearing on me here and now with such
weight that anyone with the community's common good in mind would
acknowledge the justice of my treating the latter as overriding the law and its
legal-moral obligation.
But of course these purely moral thoughts about our law certainly warrant
a theory of law, a general account of what-because it is so obviously needed
-one should anticipate finding in existence, to one degree or another, in any
human community and of what, as historical studies confirm, has indeed
existed (with many and various imperfections and reasonable and unreasonable adaptations and approximations) in virtually every human community of
which we are aware, and has been and is manifested in the translatable
language, that is, the self-understanding and thus the concepts, of every such
community.
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But whatever the case about other peoples and their concepts, it is clear to
us why we need such rules, institutions, processes, and so forth. Thus it is
clear to us what law-positive law-is, at least so far as we need it and find
we by and large have it. Nor is this core of clarity impaired by the fact that
some elements of what has been posited in our community in response to our
shared moral need are, in my judgment or yours, so unreasonable that the
presumptive moral claim on us of these elements is, in my judgment or yours,
defeated, in whole or part. Posited (enacted or judicially pronounced) rules
of the latter kind are analogous to contracts which have been made in full
compliance with every formality and other procedural condition specified by
the law of contract but are void for illegality. Or, to take two perhaps closer
analogies, they are like medicines which prove futile or lethal and are thus not
medicinal at all, or like arguments whose formal elegance only masks their
invalidity: no argument. Unjust laws are not laws, though they may still count
in reasonable conscientious deliberations, and certainly warrant attention and
description. So too, invalid arguments may win a place both in manuals of
rhetoric as the art of persuasion, and in guides to fallacies for young logicians,
quack and lethal medicines are sold as medicines and listed in histories of
medicine and on warning notices, and contracts void for illegality earn a place
both in books on the law of contract and, more interestingly, in books on
restitution where their apparent validity, or their widespread acceptance as
valid, may affect the success or quantum of a restitutionary claim. It should
go without saying that some people are persuaded by fallacies, that parties
may for years consider themselves legally bound by a contract in fact void for
invalidity, and that the police and the hangman may act against me in
accordance with unjust laws. The excitement and hostility aroused by the old
saying that unjust laws are not laws is quite needless.9
The course of practical moral deliberation and reflection which concludes
by acknowledging the need for and presumptive obligatoriness of posited law
is obvious and obviously reasonable. So there is nothing surprising about the
plain historical fact that the first articulation of positive law as a category or
a technical term, and the first adequate explanations of that term's referent,

9. On the occasion of the Lecture, Joseph Raz asked why law should be thought to be like
argument, medicine or contracts, rather than like novels or-paintings, or people, that are still
novels or paintings, or people, even if they are bad. One answer is that, like argument,
medicines, and contracts, law has a focused and normative point to which everything else about
it is properly to be regarded as subordinate. Novels and paintings, on the other hand, can have
incompatible points, e.g. to entertain or arouse (like kitsch or porn) or to tell a truth with artistry.
People exist in the natural order as living substances even if they are not functioning adequately
or at all in the orders of logic and thought, deliberation, and/or exercises of skill.
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were by moralists.1 l These theorists had little or no interest in either
undertaking or adopting any general descriptive theory of human affairs,
except insofar as understanding representative patterns of human behavior and
misbehavior is and was one element in a general reflection which from
beginning to end focused upon the question what should I-first of all the very
person doing the reflecting-truly decide and do.
The work of moral reflection, whether it is contemplatively and anticipatorily general-practical or here and now deliberatively practical, always-as
I have said-takes the world as we know it, and shuns utopianism and
Rawlsian hypotheses of a world of "full compliance" with justice. So it is also
no surprise that the moralist Thomas Aquinas, as Lon Fuller says, identified"
each of the eight elements pulled together by Lon Fuller as the components of
the Rule of Law, considered as structural requirements of justice which bear
on the institutional and procedural implementation of the justice-required
response to the need to have law rather than either mere anarchy or the
masked anarchy and oppressive unfairness of tyrannical or arbitrary government or government which treats its subjects as mere pawns, mere instruments
in some game or managerial project of the governors. (And it is no surprise
that the Thomist account of law includes "success conditions" of the kind
desired by Joseph Raz: law must be directed to the common good, is subject
to equitable override, must not go outside the domain of justice, which is
external acts affecting other people, 2 and so forth.)
In short, a complete and fully realistic theory of law can be and in all
essentials has been worked out from the starting point of the one hundred
percent normative question, what should I decide to do and, equivalently, what
kind of person should I resolve or allow myself to be. I can think of no
interesting project of inquiry left over for a philosophical theory of law with
any different starting point. Perhaps someone here today will be able to
suggest one.' 3
II
Some people have thought there is room for a theory with a different
starting point, a theory which is not even a tiny bit normative (directive of my
decisions) but instead enjoys what Brian Leiter, appropriating a phrase of John

10. See John Finnis, "The Truth in Legal Positivism" in Robert P. George (ed.), The
Autonomy of Law (Oxford: 1996), 195-214 at 195-203, 205-213.
11. For the texts, see Finnis, Aquinas, 257.
12. See Finnis, Aquinas, 222-245 cf. Raz, supra note 6, at 8-9.
13. For whatever reason, no such suggestion was offered.
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Gardner's, praises as "comprehensive normative inertness". 4 This theory
does not, Leiter says, endorse what law-abiding and justjudges or officials or
citizens do, or criticize what lawless and unjustjudges, officials or citizens do.
Instead it identifies all or at least some of the "necessary features" of what
judges, other lawyers, and I suppose officials and law-abiding citizens do in
making and/or abiding by the law.15 It aims merely to state--describe-what
features "all legal guidance necessarily has."' 6
My argument in Part I was that such an enterprise is redundant: everything
you could want as accurate and factual description of what judges, officials
and law-abiding citizens do, and why they need to do it, is supplied by the
theory which is as robustly normative in its starting point and conclusions as
anything could be, though taking in, along the way, all that the world offers
by way of variegated implementations, improvements, distortions, abuses, and
so forth. But there is, as Leiter reminds us, another question: Is a purely
descriptive, normatively 100% inert theory of law even possible? Can such
a theory identify what features all legal guidance necessarilyhas? He argues
that it is possible, and that it can identify these necessities while remaining
normatively entirely inert.
His argument brings him to conclude that "the defense of descriptive
jurisprudence turn[s] on a rather uncritical invocation of the claim that we
[are] describing 'our' concept, where the first person plural possessive [is] to
be cashed out in terms of statistical frequency,"' 7 a procedure capable of
18
delivering, as he says, "no more than ethnographically relative results."'
Such results, I think he hints, are scarcely worthy of the name of philosophy
or general theory. And certainly they fall far short of warranting, or even
making sense of, the initial claim-sponsored, curiously, by Leiter himselfto have identified what features law necessarilyhas. Whatever Leiter' s final
position, in his paper, about this question of necessities, 9 I myself fully agree
14. Brian Leiter, "Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in
Jurisprudence," American Journalof Jurisprudence48 (2003) 17, 29 quoting John Gardner,
"Legal Positivism: 5 % Myths," American Journalof Jurisprudence46 (2001) 199, 203.
15. Leiter at note 44, quoting Gardner at p. 203.
16. Leiter at note 45, quoting Gardner at p. 203.
17. Leiter at p. 50.
18. Leiter at p. 51.
19. His Quinean dismissal of the distinction between necessary and contingent truth cannot
be accepted, since the supposed distinction cannot be satisfactorily assessed if the discussion
flips, like Leiter's, into an external point of view, as when he says "there is simply the sociohistorical fact that, at any given point in the history of inquiry, there are some statements we are
unlikely to give up in the face of recalcitrant empirical evidence, and others that we are quite
willing to give up when empirical evidence conflicts." [ p. 44] The question is whether, when
we adopt an internal point of view (i.e. consider the data, evidence, subject-matter on its merits),
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with these conclusions about the project of a normatively 100% inert
descriptive philosophy or theory of law.
Unhappily, Leiter is not in agreement with my own argument for those
conclusions. He does think I have an argument; showing why my argument
is wrong will go a long way, he says, to resolving some main issues in the
present debates about method in legal theory. His demonstration that my
argument is wrong consists of a quotation from p. 16 of NaturalLaw and
NaturalRights and the brisk observation that at its core there is a non sequitur.
Here's how he puts it:
The non-sequitur occurs in the slide from ... the "Banal Truth" that "evaluations... are an indispensable and decisive component in the selection or
formation of any concepts for use in description of such aspects of human affairs
as law or legal order" to the claim that the evaluation in question involves
"decid[ing] what the requirements of practical reasonableness really are." I take
the Banal Truth to be the uncontested legacy of post-Kuhnian and post-Quniean
philosophy of science: there is no such thing as a presuppositionless inquiry, or
facts that are "theory-free," and so on. But that goes no distance at all to
establishing that the presuppositions of the descriptive enterprise require
judgments about what Finnis calls "practical reasonableness" or that the
viewpoint from which "importance" and "significance" are to be assessed is the
"practical viewpoint".20
And with that last sentence I fully agree: the Banal Truth of post-Kuhnian and
post-Quinean philosophy of science certainly goes no distance at all to
establishing my conclusion, and I've never imagined or suggested it does.
Part of the trouble here is that the passage Leiter has quoted contains none
of my argument, but only its conclusions. The sentence which begins his key
quotation from me begins, not where he starts, but like this: 'Thus by a long
march through the working or implicit methodology of contemporary
analytical jurisprudence, we arrive at the conclusion reached more rapidly
(though on the basis of a much wider social science) by Max Weber:2 namely,
we have grounds for being unwilling to give up what we consider necessary-and what these
grounds are.
20. Leiter at p. 34.
21. PaceLeiter (at note 61), what I was invoking here was not (as I put it on the page he
cites from an earlier section of my chapter) "Max Weber's not too clearly explained
methodological device, the ideal-type", but rather (as I put it in the end-note to the passage
Leiter quotes from me) Weber's specific thesis about "the necessity of the theorist using his own
evaluations in order to assess significance for descriptive theory", for which I cited (Natural
Law and NaturalRights p. 21) Weber's arguments in E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch (eds.), Max
Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, II1.: 1949), 58, 76-82, 21, as well
as Julien Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber (London: 1968), 51-61. My endnote proceeded
with some cautions about some of Weber's argumentation for his thesis. The passages that
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that [and here Leiter begins quoting] the evaluations of the theorist are an
indispensable and decisive component in the selection or formation of any
concepts for use in description of such aspects of human affairs as law or legal
order." My argument and its conclusion has nothing to do with a general
philosophy of science or of theory-construction, post Kuhn, Quine or anybody,
and nothing to do with the fact that if you're to undertake some research or
reflection you must think there's something valuable in doing so and
something important about the subject-matter. My argument is, as the
sentence says, about social science and "such aspects of human affairs as law
and legal order". What differentiates subject-matter of this broad kind from
anything in the sciences of nature or mathematics and logic is stated on pp. 1
and 2 of Natural Law and Natural Rights: unlike what I there call "natural
sciences including a part of the science of psychology," human actions,
practices, dispositions and the discourse partially constitutive of some such
practices cannot be understood without understanding their point, objective,
significance or importance "as conceived by the people who performed them,
engaged in them, etc." I here took for granted and implied, but treated as too
obvious to need stating, that those conceptions of point, objective and so forth,
the conceptions concrete people have actually had, can be well described
without being shared and, indeed, can be well described without any sharing
in the practice of evaluation at all. That is what biographers, military
historians, and others do all the time. And it is precisely this that gives rise to
the problem that set my chapter off on the "long march through the working
or implicit methodology of contemporary analytical jurisprudence."
The problem is that biography and history are one thing and a general
social theory or aphilosophy of society or power or authority or coordination
or law is (or are) something purportedly quite different. There is only one
italicized sentence in chapter I, and it is right here at the top of p. 2: "How,
then, is there to be a generaldescriptive theory of these varyingparticulars?"
There is no problem of principle or method in describing with complete valuefreedom, purity, and complete normative inertness the concerns, selfinterpretation, conduct, institutions, vocabulary and discourse of as many
people as you like. But can you finish up with anything more than what I
called, on the same page, "a conjunction of lexicography with local history,
or...a juxtaposition of all lexicographies conjoined with all local histories"
-a mere list or heap? My concern had much in common with Leiter's: the
Leiter quotes from Gerth and Mills in an effort to explicate the Weberian ideal-type reveal how
unexplained are the key terms "construction [in what sense?] of certain [which?] elements of
reality" as "theoretically illuminating [why? how?] features of varied situations." My discussion
in chapter 1 of NaturalLaw andNaturalRights endeavours to explain and justify a much higher
level of methodological specificity than anything Leiter has found in Gerth and Mills' Weber.
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concern that conceptual analysis and appeals to intuition can deliver no more
than "ethnographically relative results, 22 a lexicography or "glorified
lexicography ' '23 or "pop lexicography"24 whose results are "strictly ethnographic and local,"2 5 a "banal descriptive sociology of the Gallup-poll
variety"." 21
What the long march through contemporary jurisprudence (as it extended
from Bentham to the late 1970s) made manifest can be summarized in two
propositions: (1) any plausible theory that results from an effort to describe
law, a subject-matter considered as something transcending any local history,
has not been and will not be normatively inert; (2) this is in large part because,
given that any general theory of law, however merely descriptive its ambition,
necessarily prefers one concept of law over countless others-given (that is
to say) that the theorist's is always a more or less distinctive concept, one that
the theorist considers a superior concept, better fitted to answer the questions
people have about how law relates to other things and why its various
elements hang together as they do---explanations of why this concept is an
improved one, to be preferred to other concepts, are designed to show that this
concept, this theory, makes better sense of the complex idea that law is
something there is reason to have.
If there is a worthwhile general theory or philosophy of human cities or the
human city, as Leiter imagines but I rather doubt, it will have much the same
character: neither human laws nor human cities exist in any interesting way
unless human persons, who could think and choose otherwise, understand the
set of interlocking good reasons there are for trying to create them and
maintain them. They (the laws and cities) are not part of the world of the
naturally given, though the reasons for wanting to create and maintain laws,
if not cities, are so important for the well-being of creatures whose life and
capacities are part of the naturally given, but whose flourishing is not, that
those reasons have reasonably-though at the hazard of countless misunderstandings-been called elements of natural law (in a sense of which natural
scientists, as such, are entirely innocent).
Back to the long march through contemporary jurisprudence. No question,
however, of repeating it here. And no question of repeating my own direct
dialectical argument27 for the conclusion Leiter quoted: that there must be and
is a central case of that so-called internal point of view that plays so structural
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Leiter at p.51.
Leiter at p. 46.
Leiter note 85
Leiter at p. 46.
Leiter at p. 45.
NaturalLaw and NaturalRights, 13-16.
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a role in every contemporary jurisprudence. A reminder or two must suffice.
Hart argues, against Kelsen and (in a different way) Bentham and Austin, that
rules conferring private power on individuals (e.g. to make a contract) should
not be described as mere fragments of obligation-imposing rules. His
argument adduces or describes no fact that Bentham, Austin, and Kelsen had
failed to describe, other than the truth that there is reason to want and value
private powers, a kind of reason different from the reasons to want and respect
rules making certain kinds of act or forbearance obligatory. About this truth
Hart was not normatively inert. Precisely in order to argue for his theory as
against Kelsen's, Bentham's and Austin's, Hart called the kind of private
powers resultant from power-conferring rules "a huge and distinctive
amenity, '28 "at least as valuable to society as duty."29 Of course, he begins by
saying that, to understand these rules (and their distinctness from obligationimposing rules), we must look at them "from the point of view of those who
exercise them."3 But this point of view proves to be simply (or at least
primarily) his, yours and mine, not because they are his, yours, or mine, but
because it seems true to him, you and me, that there is value in having the
rules at stake, reason for having them (which is not in the least incompatible
with our also understanding that there might be circumstances where
countervailing reasons might give sufficient reason not to have them).
Further on in The Concept of Law, Hart argued that law should be
understood as, centrally, a union of primary with secondary rules. The former
are, he said, to impose obligations to abstain from violence theft and fraud,
and other obligations. The latter are, he said, to remedy the defects of a setup
in which rules of the primary kind were unaccompanied by rules conferring
powers to change them and adjudicate about their application-rules which
although logically secondary are so important to a society that their introduction "is a step forward" comparable to "the invention of the wheel."3 ' Talk
about valuable amenities and steps forward cannot reasonably be described as
normatively inert.
Hart's discussion is particularly illuminating when he takes up the precise
question whether there are, as Leiter and Gardner propose, some "necessary"
features of law or legal systems or what lawyers do. Hart does so in relation
to "the traditional question whether every legal system must [his italics]
provide for sanctions".32 There are, he says, "two unsuitable alternatives
which are often taken as exhaustive: on the one hand that of saying that this
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Hart,
Ibid.,
Id.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

The Concept of Law, 41.
41.
42.
199.
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is required by 'the' meaning of the words 'law' or 'legal system', and on the
other hand of saying that it is 'just a fact' that most legal systems do provide
for sanctions." 33 (So here he is also taking up, in order to set aside, the
statistical typicality criterion that Leiter's paper seemed for a time to be
proposing.) "Neither of these alternatives is satisfactory. There are no settled
principles forbidding the use of the word 'law' of systems where there are no
centrally organized sanctions, and there is good reason (though no compulsion) for using the expression 'international law' of a system which has none.
On the other hand", he goes on, "we do need to distinguish the place that
sanctions must have within a municipal system, if it is to serve the purposes
of beings constituted as men are. We can say, given the setting of natural
facts and aims which make sanctions both possible and necessary in a
municipal system, that this is a natural necessity; and some such phrase is
needed also to convey the status of the minimum forms of protection for
persons, property, and promises which are indispensable features of municipal
law." Six pages earlier he had given this form of necessity a description more
illuminating than the opaque term "natural"; he had called it "rational": "It is
important to stress the distinctively rational connexion between natural facts
and legal or moral rules,"34 and again: "the facts mentioned [about vulnerability and so forth] afford a reason [Hart's italics] why, given survival as an aim,
law and morals should include a specific content."35 This content must-that
is, there is a strong rational requirement that it-include sanctions. Why?
Because "submission to the system of restraints would be folly if there were
no organization for the coercion of those who would then try to obtain the
advantages of the system without submitting to its obligations. 'Sanctions' are
therefore required [necessary, Leiter and Gardner might say] not as the normal
motive for obedience, but as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily
obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not. To obey, without this,
would be to risk going to the wall. Given this standing danger what reason
demands is voluntary co-operation in a coercive system. "36 Nothing
normatively inert about all or any of this.
But of course, Hart wanted to keep to a minimum the normative virility of
his explanatory-descriptive account. Only the minimum of purpose or
purposes (conception(s) of value) is meant to get into the account, and in this
minimum the only identified component is the purpose or good of survival.
Concern for survival might indeed explain well enough why a legal system
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Ibid., 193.
Id.
Ibid., 198.
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must contain rules against the free use of violence and sanctions against
violation of those rules. Concern for survival does not seem a plausibly
sufficient explanation for the alleged necessity of rules providing even
"minimum forms of protection for... property, and promises which are
similarly indispensable [necessary] features of municipal law."37 And it has
virtually no explanatory power in relation to the other great feature of law
which Hart's whole book argues is necessary: the set of secondary rules of
change, adjudication, and recognition which together move us from the prelegal (or the non-paradigmatically "legal," like international law) to the
paradigmatically or centrally legal, instantiated by mature systems of
municipal law. The defects which these rules are needed [necessary] to
remedy have little to do with survival. One cannot speak of defects and
remedies without presupposing some good diminished or damaged by the
defect; if the good is merely a supposed good, the defect will be merely a
supposed defect. But Hart speaks of defects, not supposed defects. Still, he
does not identify the goods harmed by these defects, beyond glancing
references to uncertainty, waste, vendettas and the absence of that earliermentioned amenity and great step forward of being able to change and shift
and vary the obligations imposed upon one by general rules.38 What matters,
however, is that he has here, at the heart of his theory, quite left behind the
concern for minimum purposes.
According to Leiter, "Finnis admits... that positivism- understood either
in Hart's or Raz's version-gives an adequate account of 'what any competent
lawyer...would say are (or are not) intra-systemically valid laws, imposing
"legal requirements"' .39 And then he intimates surprise that I do not treat this
concession of mine as an admission of "natural law theory's demise". Even
if I had made this admission or concession, Leiter's surprise would be
misplaced because, as I have argued above, natural law theory can do, did, and
does all that is needed to describe law's positivity-to describe, that is to say,
the kind of law that has among the necessary conditions for its existence the
sheer fact that it has been made or adopted by some person or persons at some
identifiable place and period. But I made no admission about the "adequacy"
of anyone's account. Here is the passage containing the sentence that Leiter
has, I'm afraid, misunderstood. It makes no reference to Hart or Raz or their
accounts, and neither asserts nor presupposes that their accounts have the
normative inertness to which paradigmatic positivism aspires.4" It is, as the
37. Ibid., 199.
38. Ibid., 93.
39. Leiter at 28-29.
40. Hart conceived his account of the necessity of sanctions and primary rules as a "reply
to the positivist thesis that 'law may have any content"': ibid., 199.
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sentence and paragraphs preceding it make explicit, a sentence concerned with
laws that, though widely treated as valid, and rigorously enforced, are very
unjust:
Positivism never coherently reaches beyond reporting attitudes and convergent
behaviour (perhaps the sophisticated and articulate attitudes that constitute a set
of rules of recognition, change and adjudication). It has nothing to say to
officials or private citizens who want to judge whether, when, and why the
authority and obligatoriness claimed and enforced by those who are acting as
officials of a legal system, and by their directives, are indeed authoritative
reasons for their own conscientious action. Positivism, at this point, does no
more than repeat (i) what any competent lawyer-including every legally
competent adherent of natural law theory-would say are (or are not) intrasystemically valid laws, imposing 'legal requirements' and (ii) what any streetwise observer would warn are the likely consequences of non-compliance.
Positivism is ...
redundant. 4
So far from admitting that a normatively inert description of law gives an
adequate account of anything, I was saying there, and-subject to an
important qualification that I shall come to later-I am happy to repeat, that
positivism in Leiter's sense gives no account, no theory or what Hart would
call elucidation or explanation, at all, let alone an adequate one. The
aspiration to be normatively inert makes it impossible to provide any
explanation of the kind Hart was seeking throughout his work.
Leiter says my objections "seem to reflect, at bottom, misunderstanding
of.. .the 'comprehensive normative inertness' of legal positivism." I don't
doubt that I may misunderstand it from top to bottom. But if so, it will not
have been for want of attention to this aspiration to normative inertness, and
to the travails of theorists who struggle to reconcile that aspiration with their
other aspirations: to identify what is and is not necessary in law and legal
systems, and to add some explanatory or elucidatory content to what every
competent lawyer or citizen already knows. My first published essay on
41. John Finnis, "The Incoherence of Legal Positivism" p. 1611; also in "Natural Law: the
Classical Tradition" in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Jurisprudenceand Philosophy of Law (Oxford, 2002), at p. 23. The ellipses are filled as
follows: "It cannot explain the authoritativeness, for an official's or a private citizen's
conscience (ultimate rational judgment), of these alleged and imposed requirements, nor their
lack of such authority when radically unjust. Positivism is not only incoherent. It is also
redundant." The incoherence is explained earlier as "its inherent and self-imposed incapacity
to succeed in the explanatory task it sets itself." In the terminology of the present article, it is
the incoherence of complete normative inertness with the ambition to explain law (even
descriptively). There is no confusion in my article between incoherence and mere failure to seek
a moral justification.
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general practical philosophy, nearly 35 years ago, began with a study42 of
Kelsen's efforts to determine whether positivism's comprehensive normative
inertness (called by him purity) requires or permits legal theory to say that
legal systems make sense, that is, whether it is a necessary feature of legal
systems that they exclude the juristic finding that completely contradictory
legal rules (norms) coexist, each equally valid. In the end, Kelsen came to the
same conclusion as I did in that paper: that a theory does not have comprehensive normative inertness unless it holds that contradictory legal norms can
coexist, each equally valid. To treat non-contradiction as a necessary feature
of law is to surrender to natural law methods of theorising, he judged.4 3
Most other people who wish to think of themselves as normatively inert
when doing legal theory have denied that their aspiration requires of them this
late-Kelsenian austerity. They think a purpose of giving coherent guidance
should be included among the "minimum purposes" of any legal system and
is thus a necessary feature of law. I cannot think of any good reason,
compatible with normative inertness, for their thinking this. As I argued 35
years ago: Why should not some regime wish to use the law's norm-creating
capacities to keep the population at its mercy by confronting them with
contradictory legal requirements, so that the regime's judges and other
officials can enforce against selected persons whichever of a pair of contradictory legal norms those officials choose: either, or both, or neither? And I
would now go on to add: Why should it not do so in accordance with some
further secret rule of law? How can one justify the legal-theoretical (or socalled conceptual) claim that law must be promulgated? How can Austin
justify his legal-theoretical claim that one type of particular command of a
sovereign is a law but another is necessarily not? How can Hart justify his
claim that a rule of recognition is a necessary feature of legal systems? Or
power-conferring laws, distinct from obligation-imposing laws? Or rules of
change? How can Joseph Raz justify his claim that it is a necessary feature
of laws that they claim legitimate moral authority? Why should not some
regime set up a legal system which has every feature of, say, Hart's concept
42. John Finnis, "Reason, Authority and Friendship in Law and Morals", in Khanbai, Katz
& Pineau (eds), Jowett Papers 1968-1969 (Oxford, 1979), 101-24 at 103.
43. Hans Kelsen, GeneralTheory ofNorms (Oxford, 1991), 214,217,224,391,394-5. He
also (ibid., 226-241) judged it a fatal breach of comprehensive normative inertness for legal
theory to hold that if [PI] a valid legal norm of a jurisdiction specifies that thieves ought to be

imprisoned for ten years, and [P2] Smith a subject in that jurisdiction has committed theft, then
[P3] it is legally required that Smith ought to be imprisoned for ten years. For legal theory to
hold that P3 is legally required by P1 and P2 would be for legal theory to participate in practical

reasoning; the time for legal theory to assert P3 is after someone with legal authority to do so
decides that P3; only then can legal theory include P3 in its inert description of that legal

system.
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of law but expressly asserts that morality is for sissies, and that its authority
as a system of law is nothing more, and nothing less, than its willingness and
ability to impose sanctions, damages awards, injunctions, requisitions, etc., for
non-compliance?
In all such cases, it seems to me, there is no necessity to be had save
necessity of the kind that good practical reasons pick out for us when we are
deliberating about what to want and choose to try to have, necessities that thus
earn a place in a normatively virile theory or philosophy of law.
Ell
A word about "earning a place in the theory or philosophy of law". Like
Leiter, Jules Coleman argues that the norms for evaluating theories "are
pragmatic, theoretical, epistemic, and most importantly, discursive".' Unlike
Leiter, Coleman thinks that theories of law are theories of the concept of law,
and he says: "We are choosing a theory of the concept-the best theory of the
concept-as part of a construction of a general theory of the world and the
concepts we employ to structure it. Different theories of the concept allow us
to nest law and the concept of it differently: some emphasizing its centrality
to the guidance of conduct; others to the theory of political obligation; others
to an ideal of the person that can be realized only given certain social forms
and institutions." For my part, I think theories of law are concepts of law, not
theories of concepts.45 I think no good theory is ever chosen; it's a matter of
judgment, not choice: the subject-matter is in command, and our only choice
is whether to pursue the questions that occur to us about it, and to respect the
disciplines of truth: evidence, coherence, and the like. We don't, strictly
speaking, construct a general theory of the world, we develop one. And I
cannot imagine why a theory of law could not and should not say what is true
about law's "centrality to the guidance of conduct" and to political obligation
and to the reality of persons and the way in which their flourishing "can be
44. Jules Coleman, The Practiceof Principle:In Defence of a PragmatistApproach to
Legal Theory (Oxford, 2001), 196.
45. So I agree with much in Leiter's critique of "conceptual analysis." But if the
"naturalistic turn", with which he associates that critique, is well represented, as he suggests
(Leiter notes 78 and 106), by Quine's essay "Natural Kinds", in W.V. Quine, Ontological
Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press, 1963), 114-38, it seems likely to be
a turn for the even worse: Quine's essay is a striking example of (multiple) self-refutation,
relying again and again on distinctions between natural kinds of e.g. arguments, disciplines,
stages in "the [human] race's progress", etc., etc., to argue that "it is a mark of maturity of a
branch [scil. kind] of science that the notion of similarity or kind finally dissolves, so far as is
relevant that branch of science" (p. 121), that "induction itself is essentially only...animal
expectation or habit formation" (p. 125), and so on.
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realized only given certain social forms and institutions." No need at all for
"different theories". A page or two earlier, Coleman had been speaking more
realistically, about what is and is not "inherent in the nature of law."' Indeed,
he said that "the morally attractive property of law is its inherent potential to
realize or to manifest an ideal of governance."
But then Coleman went on to argue for what we can call the paperweight
theory of law. It goes like this. Law is a thing that, by its nature,4 7 has the
inherent capacity to realize certain moral ideals. Because that is indeed an
inherent capacity, an analysis of law "should help us to understand what we
find morally attractive about it, and an analysis that failed to do so would be
lacking. '48 But though hammers have the inherent capacity to be paperweights, being a paperweight or suitable for service as a paperweight is no
part of the concept of a hammer. So too (the argument goes), being morally
attractive is no part of the concept or proper analysis or theory of law:
"autonomy, dignity, welfare do not enter at any point into the analysis.. .nor
do any other moral properties. These ideals are external to the concept of law;
law [just] happens to be the kind of thing that can serve them well., 49 Justice,
like human rights, dignity and welfare, is as external to the concept or nature
of law as the hammer's capacity to serve as a paperweight, or as the backbone
of a garden gnome, is external to the concept and nature of a hammer.
This confident and unargued slicing between what is internal and what
external to the nature of law overlooks the truth for which I have been arguing
throughout this lecture. One can reasonably spend a lifetime of using
hammers without ever noticing that they would be good as paperweights or the
backbones of garden gnomes. But one cannot begin to understand what law
is about without noticing, not merely that it shares much of the same actionguiding vocabulary as morality, but--overwhelmingly more important-that
it does so because it purports to occupy the same place in the world as
morality: the decisive framing of the options for choice at the point where
deliberation is ending in decision about what I should do and what kind of
person I should be. To hold that the "morally attractive" virtue of justice
stands to judicial responsibilities for adjudicating disputes according to law
as loosely and extrinsically as paperweights and garden gnomes stand to
hammers is, I suggest, a plain reductio ad absurdum. °
46. Ibid., 192.
47. Ibid., 194.
48. Ibid., 195.
49. Id.
50. As Raz says, in his The Authority ofLaw (Oxford, 1979), 159, 158: "positivists can and
should adopt" the thesis "that normative terms like 'a right', 'a duty', 'ought' are used in the
same sense in legal, moral, and other normative statements."
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IV

As I mentioned earlier, I should qualify an assertion I made in the essay
from which Leiter quoted: that, given its desire for normative inertness,
positivism cannot do more than replicate what every lawyer already says. The
qualification: it is a mistake to talk about positivism at all. I have been trying
for decades not to do this sort of thing, and I repent of having done it. (My
excuse for having done it is not worth exploring here.) Better to think: there's
no such thing as positivism.
Take, for example, the talk of "normative inertness" which I have been
pursuing through much of this lecture. Here is Leiter's phrase: "what John
Gardner has aptly called the 'comprehensive normative inertness' of legal
positivism."5 But in Gardner's essay, the subject of which "comprehensive
normative inertness" is predicated is aproposition,labeled by Gardner (LP*):
"In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether
it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits
(where its merits, in the relevant senses, include the merits of its sources)."52
Thus Gardner's full phrase is: "the comprehensive normative inertness in
(LP*)."' 5 And then Gardner, unlike Leiter, goes on to make the following
points about (LP*):
(i)

(ii)

It' 4 "is not a whole theory of law's nature, after all. It is a thesis about
legal validity, which is compatible with any number of further theses about
naturesubject
law's nature, including the thesis that all valid law is by its
55
to special moral objectives and imperatives of its own.,
(LP*) relates to the question "Is this really a law" and not to the "more
abstract" question "What is law?" And "once one has tackled the question
whether a certain law is valid there remain many relatively independent
questions to address concerning its meaning, its fidelity to law's purposes,
its role in sound legal reasoning, its legal effects, and its social functions...
To study the nature of law one needs to turn one's mind to the philosophical aspects of these further questions too. To these further questions there
is no distinctively 'legal positivist' answer, because legal positivism is a
thesis only about the conditions of legal validity. 56

51. Leiter p. 29.
52. Gardner, "Legal Positivism: 5 V Myths," at 201.
53. Ibid., 203.
54. Ibid., 210: The subject of his sentence is "Legal positivism" but the whole context
shows that this is here understood as or stipulated to be a theory whose entire content is (LP*).
55. Id. (emphases added).
56. Ibid., 224.
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Natural Law and Natural Rights "tak[es]
(LP*) for granted although
5

remaining studiously unexcited about it". 1
(iv) Legal positivists "need not deny that in some contexts 'legality'...names
a moral value, such that...laws may be more or less valid depending on
... their merits. Nor need they deny that one must capture this5' moral value
of legality.. .in order to tell the whole story of law's nature. 1
So: the normative inertness endorsed by Gardner is vastly narrower than that
endorsed by Leiter or by Kelsen in their envisaged positivist accounts of
"law's essential properties" 59 or nature.
And here is Gardner on the thesis which Jules Coleman and Brian Leiter
(writing in 1996) take to be one of the "two central beliefs" shared by "all
[legal] positivists"-that "there is no necessary connection between law and
morality": 6° writing in 2001 and using the identical words to articulate the
thesis, Gardner says it is an absurd thesis. That legal positivists hold this
thesis is, he surprisingly adds, a mere myth. 6'

To cut a very long story short, the question whether any truth is conveyed
"by legal positivism", like the question what is to be understood by "legal
positivism," is a gloomy jungle into which it is best never to stray.
As Gardner remarked, I see little to object to in (LP*). The sense it gives
the terms "legally valid" and "law" is precisely the sense needed to give sense
to the well-known slogan, recalled in Part I and not usually associated with
legal positivism, "an unjust law [something legally valid in its making but
seriously unjust]-is not a law [lacks something essential to law's central
purpose of determining what I truly should do]." (Recall: a bad argument is
no argument-and all the other analogous sayings.) Once one acknowledges
that there is strong (moral) reason to recognize some persons as having the
responsibility and thus the authority of changing the answer to the question
What truly should I do?-changing it by their sheer say-so, their law-making
or law-determining act--one is bound to acknowledge the utility of a concept
of intra-systemic legal validity responsive to no questions other than this
question: Was such and such indeed what it appears to have been, a lawmaking or law-determining act of the kind those persons were authorized to
make, and done in the manner and form required for it and its normative
juridical product to be authentic, that is, legally valid? Answering that
57. Ibid., 227..
58. Ibid., 226.
59. Leiter, p. 51.
60. Coleman and Leiter, p. 241.
61. Gardner, p. 223. But Coleman and Leiter are in very good company: e.g. Hart, Essays
on Bentham, 262-3: "positivist jurisprudence, ... like Bentham's and my own work[,] denies that
there is any conceptual or necessary connection between law and morality..."
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question, and deploying the corresponding concept of legal validity, can be a
matter simply of social-fact sources, and involve no inspection of merits.
As Gardner also said, that question does not settle what a judge should do,
and more generally leaves entirely untouched the question "whether and when
and why any of us should ever bother to have or to follow any valid legal
norms."6 2 The positivist interest in the (LP*) sense of law and legal validity,
as Gardner went on to say, "does not distinguish law from a game.
"But",
as he rightly adds "law is not a game. It purports to bind us morally, i.e. in a
way that binds even those of us who do not fancy playing."' And one cannot
tell whether it succeeds or fails in its endeavor to do so, unless one tells "the
whole story of law's nature" and why "legality" in certain contexts has a much
richer meaning than "legal validity" in the (LP*) sense.
So John Gardner faced up to the problem that does indeed confront him:
"Why begin [the necessary inquiry into law's whole nature] by asking about
[law's] legal validity in the thin, practically noncommittal [normatively inert]
sense found in (LP*)?" 65 His response was that this is the right place to begin
because the question (LP*) tries to answer is "alogically prior question. What
is the field of human endeavor, to which the natural lawyer's proposed criteria
[of legality and the nature of law] apply?"' And so we come back to the point
I took up on p.1 of Natural Law and NaturalRights and have taken up again
in this lecture: the assumption that in relation to human things constituted by
human choices, like law, you can answer the question What is it? before you
tackle the question Why choose to have it, create it, maintain it, and comply
with it? That assumption, I have been arguing, is a philosophical mistake,
induced or at least made apparently plausible by the surface grammar of the
latter question. I think that this mistake sets many of my friends and
colleagues off on the wrong foot.
Even so, most of us end up on the same road and indeed at much the same
point on the road. Their (official) route to that point has, I admit, the
attraction of making it seem possible to build a legal-philosophical dwelling
place without first spending time on the foundations.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Gardner, 225.
Ibid., 227.
Ibid., 226.
Ibid., 227.
Ibid., 226.

